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27 May 1960

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CENTRAL

INTELLIGENCE

BULLETIN



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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

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### DAILY BRIEF

#### I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

\*USSR: A public lecturer in Moscow in a 25 May discussion of the international situation stressed the "temporary" nature of the current increase in tensions, and assured his audience that the "basic forces" leading to a further relaxation of tensions were still operative. A Soviet Embassy official in Belgrade, apparently acting under instructions, expressed his view that US-Soviet relations would soon improve and that new negotiations could begin "at any time." Soviet propaganda commentary on President Eisenhower's address of 25 May, however, and Gromyko's UN speech of 26 May indicate that Moscow intends to maintain its shrill public criticism of the United States over the U-2 incident.

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Mali: [The Mali Federation of Senegal and Soudan plans to set up an embassy in Moscow as well as in three Western and four African capitals following its attainment of independence within]

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[the French Community on 20 June. In the UN, to which Mali expects to be admitted this fall, the new state probably will support the admission of Communist China.]

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#### IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

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West New Guinea Problem, SNIE 65-2-60. 24 May 60.

#### LATE ITEM

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\*Turkish Military Seizes Government: (information as of 0400 EDT, 27 May) Turkish Army units supported by Navy and Air Force elements seized control of Ankara and Istanbul in an apparently bloodless coup in the early morning of 27 May. President Bayar, most cabinet ministers in Ankara, and several of the highest ranking army officers are reported under arrest. Prime Minister Menderes, who was last reported touring in western Anatolia about 125 miles west of Ankara, apparently has not yet been taken. The coup was carried out by younger officers, with cadets of the military academy apparently taking a major role. Representatives of the "military council" which is in control called at the American Embassy almost immediately to give assurances that the coup was directed only against the Menderes government and that Turkey would remain "a stanch ally of the United States as well as a devoted member of NATO." These military representatives promised early free elections

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and stated that those government officials responsible for the previous regime's undemocratic measures would be tried by civilian courts. Brigadier General Refik Tulga has taken over as mayor and governor of Istanbul. He is a former military attaché in the United States and is described as "exceedingly pro-American."

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## I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

### Soviet Views on Future US-Soviet Relations

Private comments by Soviet diplomats, together with the line taken by a public lecturer in Moscow, are designed to emphasize that the breakdown in the Paris talks does not herald a far-reaching revision of Soviet policy toward the West. At a lecture on the international situation on 25 May, the speaker spelled out this approach along the lines established by Khrushchev in his Berlin speech on 20 May. The lecturer emphasized that the current increase in tensions was of a temporary nature and assured his audience that the "basic forces" leading to relaxation of tensions were still operative.

The lecturer claimed that, in contrast to "consistent failure" prior to Stalin's death, subsequent Soviet efforts to reduce tension had been successful; as the summit approached, however, it became clear that no progress could be expected on Berlin, and the US announcement on 7 May of plans to conduct nuclear tests to improve detection techniques "scuttled" the sole issue with good prospects for agreement.

According to an American Embassy officer attending the lecture, the speaker was on the defensive in justifying Khrushchev's stand at Paris and in minimizing the adverse consequences. The comments and questions of the audience revealed skepticism over the objectives to be gained by the Soviet actions in the Security Council. The audience also appeared concerned over the possible effects on US-Soviet relations of a trial of Francis Powers and the conclusion of a separate East German peace treaty.

Soviet diplomats apparently have instructions to offset the shrill public attacks on the United States by taking a conciliatory line in conversations with Americans. A Soviet official in Belgrade expressed the belief that US-Soviet relations would improve soon and that new negotiations could be held "at any time." He added that Khrushchev had the "highest regard" for President Eisenhower. [In Vienna, a Soviet Embassy officer told the New York Times correspondent that there would be no "basic change" in Soviet policy toward the West.]

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East Germans Reportedly Planning Measures to Curb  
East German Travel to Berlin

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[A mounting proportion of the total East German escapes-- more than 50,000 in the first four months of 1960--have been made through West Berlin; the regime has been able to impose increasingly effective security precautions on the East - West German frontier. In an effort to discover potential refugees, police now make frequent checks of credentials of East Germans going to East Berlin. Nevertheless, more than 3,800 persons fled to West Berlin in the week ending 17 May, and flights are continuing at a high level. The regime may be considering some new type of identity document as part of its campaign against escapes.]

[Khrushchev's failure to take any immediate steps toward a separate peace treaty, which would transfer West Berlin access controls to the East Germans, has placed Ulbricht in a difficult position. Evidently barred from imposing harsh controls on travel to and from West Berlin, he is casting about for additional measures to make East German access to East Berlin still more difficult, although he claims the city is the East German capital.]

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Mali Planning Diplomatic Relations With Bloc

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[The Federation of Mali, consisting of the West African states of Senegal and Soudan, plans to establish an embassy in Moscow following Mali's attainment of independence within the French Community on 20 June, according to Senegalese leader Leopold Senghor, who is expected to become president of the new state. Initial diplomatic missions also are planned for Paris, Washington, London, and four African capitals, including Conakry. Mali will be represented elsewhere by France, under the terms of a diplomatic accord signed last month.]

[In a conversation on 23 May with the American consul general in Dakar, Senghor indicated that he personally had favored delaying for a year or two any exchange of representatives with the USSR, but that the Soudanese had insisted on taking such action immediately. Many Soudanese leaders are strongly influenced by Marxism and predisposed toward friendly ties with Communist countries. Their influence seems certain to predominate within independent Mali's foreign ministry as a result of a recent deal allocating that portfolio to Soudan and the presidency and defense ministry to Senegal.]

[Senghor stated he had been "categoric" in resisting Soudanese arguments to send an ambassador to Peiping as well as Moscow. At the same time, however, he voiced a preference for recognizing "both Chinas" and indicated that Mali intended to support the admission of Communist China to the UN. Mali itself expects to become a UN member this fall, along with a number of other new African states. Earlier, Senghor had told a correspondent for the North Vietnamese news agency that Mali favored the establishment of relations with "all states of Indochina, including the Democratic Republic of Vietnam."]

[Peiping, which succeeded in 1958 in obtaining recognition from Morocco, the Sudan, and Guinea, recently has been faced with lively competition from Taipei, which established diplomatic relations with both Cameroun and Togo earlier this year. A pending request by Nationalist China to open a consulate in Dakar, the Mali capital, has reportedly been approved by Senegal but seems likely to be blocked by the Soudanese.]

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